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Riding in Cars Between Men
John M. Sloop
Through an analysis of public discourse surrounding two different controversies featuring
professional race car driver, Deborah Renshaw, this article foregrounds contemporary
relationships between gender and (auto)mobility. It draws on both theories of gender
performativity and media ecology to outline the ways in which the automobile as a
technology influences gender performance and the ways in which the automobile is
understood through cultural discourses that are already largely gendered. The essay uses
the discourse surrounding the Renshaw case to problematize both contemporary gender
norms and understandings of the relationship between prosthetic media and the body.
Keywords: Gender Performativity; Automobility; Deborah Renshaw; Homosociality;
Prosthetic Media
The car has become an article of dress without which we feel uncertain, unclad, and
incomplete in the urban compound. . . . Cars have become the real population of
our cities, with a resulting loss of human scale. . . .*/Marshall McLuhan1
What happens when women drive cars, instead of adorning men’s cars, instead of
sitting, fixed and still, draped across them? What happens when women wear cars
instead of clothes?*/Sharon Willis2
The highs and lows of NASCAR and ARCA driver Deborah Renshaw’s 2002 racing
season were extreme to say the least.3 During this one year, Renshaw first saw her star
rise rapidly as the dual effect of her skill as a driver and of her role as a ‘‘victim’’ in a
well-publicized ‘‘conspiracy’’ at the Nashville Speedway. By season’s end, however,
Renshaw’s fortunes reversed as she was involved in a near career-ending disaster when
the car she was driving during a practice session broadsided another car, instantly
killing driver Eric Martin. While a number of lessons have been drawn from this case
by race officials, it is also useful as one route by which cultural critics might draw
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lessons about the intersections of popular understandings of the proper performance
of gender and the relationship between body media (i.e., prosthetics broadly defined)
and the gendered body. As I will illustrate, first, the constraints of gender
performativity*/at least as described by Judith Butler4*/are thrown into relief not
only in the reported actions and statements of those involved in this case but also in
the discourse reporters use to describe those actions and statements.5 Second, while
some contemporary discussions of the posthuman body (i.e., the changing meaning
of the body as it merges with a wide variety of prosthetics and technologies) suggest
possibilities for the blurring of gender norms, this case highlights the cultural
constraints on such transitions.
The story, as conveyed primarily through print news reports , unfolds as follows.6 In
early 2002, one who followed the lower divisions of NASCAR would likely have begun
to notice the name ‘‘Deborah Renshaw’’ appearing repeatedly. Not only was Renshaw
racing on a weekly basis, but she was also placing well in many of those races, for a
short time leading the point standings for the weekly series at the Nashville
Fairgrounds Speedway. Moreover, and perhaps more pointedly, Renshaw was being
held forth as the ‘‘prototype’’ of female drivers by those in NASCAR circles who
thought female drivers would be a way to expand the demographic of NASCAR’s fan
base. In short, she was positioned as a marketable female, combining driving skills
with ‘‘ladylike’’ attractiveness.
In mid-July, however, events on the racing circuit moved Renshaw from the pages
of local (regional and sport) press coverage to a broader realm of sports and news
interest, garnering interview opportunities with Connie Chung, Bryant Gumble, and
The Regis and Kelly Show, and news coverage in large market dailies as well as USA
Today.7 Here is what is reported to have happened. On 14 July, competing driver
Mark Day pooled money from almost all of the other (male) drivers racing that night,
entered a car which pitted early in the race, and posted the $3,600 fee required to have
another driver’s engine inspected.8 Understanding that the protest was a plot by most,
if not all, of the male drivers, Nashville Fairgrounds Speedway President Dennis Grau
received permission from NASCAR officials to void the protest. Renshaw’s team,
confident that the engine met regulations, insisted that Grau have it broken down and
inspected. By the time the inspection was over, Renshaw had been disqualified. The
inspectors found a cylinder hold less than one centimeter too large*/a violation that
Grau claimed would not by itself have given Renshaw’s car any advantage.
Nonetheless, rules dictated that Renshaw’s sixth place finish, and the season points
that would be accrued with that finish, be forfeited. In effect, the points she forfeited
in this one race also ended her quest for the season title at the track.
The day following the protest and forfeiture, Renshaw declared publicly that she
would never race in Nashville again, feeling humiliated and at risk because she was
surrounded by male drivers who had chosen to gang up on her. However, public
outcry against the group of male drivers*/accompanied by dual assurances by high-
level NASCAR officials that Renshaw would not face such behavior again and that she
(and her family) would be protected*/encouraged her enough that she agreed to
return to the track. When she did return, it was not only to the track but also to a
192 J. M. Sloop
media environment in which she was now in the role of the ‘‘star female driver’’ who
had been ganged up on by a large number of boys*/boys whose masculinity had
been threatened by her driving skills.9 Moreover, precisely because of the attention
that was given to the plot, NASCAR team owner Rick Goodwin also became aware of
Renshaw. While acknowledging that he had never heard of Renshaw before the
controversy, he hired her to be the driver of his Busch Series car for the 2003 season.10
Ultimately, the plot against Renshaw worked rhetorically in her favor, enabling her to
garner a larger fan base, more sponsorship, a ‘‘promotion’’ for the 2003 season, and
the opportunity to race faster cars on the ARCA circuit in 2002.11
With trouble seemingly behind her, Renshaw drove in a number of races at both
small tracks and on the ARCA circuit with longer tracks and faster cars. In early
October, while practicing at Lowe’s Motor Speedway in Concorde, NC for the
EasyCare 150, Renshaw’s car broadsided the car driven by racer Eric Martin, who was
killed instantly by the impact. While Renshaw underwent surgery for multiple
fractures in her left foot and ankle, drivers and sports reporters began to question her
skills, her level of responsibility for Martin’s death, and, finally, ARCA safety
regulations. As the year came to a close, not only did ARCA institute new policies as a
result of this incident, but Renshaw lost her sponsorship deal with Goodwin and was
implicitly and explicitly blamed for Martin’s death.
When the discursive field that surrounded Renshaw during these events*/a
discourse that helped produce and resignify her ‘‘femininity’’ in this ‘‘masculine’’
domain*/is understood as partially the product of the gendered history of the
automobile, we have an interesting location from which to investigate the ways in
which the ‘‘common sense’’ ideology of mass culture encourages the reiteration of
particular gender norms.12 Thus, I focus specifically on the public discussion of
Renshaw’s story both as a way of bringing the sedimented discourses of gender’s
cultural ‘‘common sense’’ into relief and as a way of troubling those norms and
expectations.13 I begin by outlining some of my assumptions about the automobile as
a technology or (prosthetic) medium with implications for gender, gender’s
performative qualities, and, finally, the historical articulations made between and
among gender, automobiles and stock car racing. Second, I provide a critical reading
of the discourse concerning the plot against Renshaw early in the season and
reporting about Renshaw after the death of driver Eric Martin. Ultimately, I see this
case, like all cases of public controversy with gender as a primary focus, as a location
or opportunity to problematize the particular configuration of gender performance
and gender expectations loosely shared in contemporary US culture, as well as a route
to further conversations about the body’s relationship to technology.14
The Automobile as Prosthetic and Cultural Object
To begin to think about a relationship between cars and gender is to think of the
automobile both as a medium or prosthetic for the body and as a discursive object that
enters a culture with preexisting gender/sexual meanings. That is, we must think
about the car both as an ‘‘extension of the self ’’ and as an object of ideological
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meanings. Ultimately, there is a rhetorical tension between the ways in which the
‘‘automobile as medium/prosthetic’’ encourages an erasure of the importance of
gender (via McLuhan’s ‘‘loss of human scale’’) and sedimented cultural under-
standings of gender and of the automobile (Sharon Willis is concerned, after all, with
women wearing cars rather than clothes).
In the first epigraph of this essay, Marshall McLuhan asks that the car*/like all
technologies*/be understood as a prosthetic, yet another ‘‘extension of man’’ [sic].
From this perspective, one interested in gender would ask, ‘‘Regardless of the cultural
context in which the automobile emerged, what are its influences on cultural
understandings of gender or sexuality?’’ That is, what are the ways in which the
existence of the automobile as a dominant technology changed or transformed
cultural understandings of gender because of the ways the car altered our relationship
with geographic space and time?15 As cars become readily available, obviously
enough, space and distance are changed; we can cover more ground and move more
efficiently with the car than without, and this efficiency alters social relations and the
meaning of particular locations. For example, as John Howard illustrates in his
history of male homosexuality in the southern United States, as more and more
people began to own cars, gay spaces*/and a sense of a gay community*/could
develop more easily: ‘‘The automobile provided not only the means of transport, but
also a place of intersection. The quasi-public space of the interior became the site for
communication.’’16 Transportation allowed the creation of a larger sense of
communication and confirmation of marginal sexualities, and, as a result, it helped
blur stable definitions and essential qualities.17 Further, Scharff suggests that the very
existence of cars helped problematize gender because it began to blur public and
‘‘private’’ or domestic spaces, encouraging a slow devolution of the assignment of
males to the public and females to the private.18
More directly, drawing upon the well-known work of Donna Haraway, Gilles
Deleuze, Claudia Springer, and others, Rosi Braidotti has recently addressed the
potential of contemporary ‘‘prosethetic’’/cyborg technologies to aid a cultural
rethinking of the meaning of the (post)-human body.19 Braidotti notes that one
common characteristic of many early theories of the post-human body is a slightly
utopian tendency to underscore the ways in which the human/technology merge aids
a blurring or rethinking of gender subject positions. In such an equation, the
automobile becomes one of many technological ‘‘prosthetics’’ which function as a
supposedly gender-troubling/gender-blurring extension of the body. Hence, if we
think of the car as body covering or as an extension of the body, it is a costume or
prosthetic that is equally open to all drivers regardless of gender/sexuality and that
functions ‘‘equally’’ for all, making each person equally fast, similarly shaped.
Only a moment’s reflection, however, would tell us that the equation between
technology and culture is not quite that smooth. Indeed, as John Jordan recently
observed in drawing upon contemporary scholarship on the cyborg imaginary,
notions of smooth cyberbodies are being challenged as undelivered and perhaps
undeliverable.20 For example, in the case of automobiles, not only do most of us have
some vague idea of what colloquially constitutes a ‘‘male’’ and a ‘‘female’’ car, but we
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know that cars, like all new technologies, enter a culture with gendered meanings that
in turn shape its meaning. For example, as both Scharff and Sean O’Connell
respectively discuss in their histories of gender and automobiles in the United States
and in British society, the automobile was gendered since its inception, since
marketing concerns drove our cultural understanding of the car almost as soon as it
became a ‘‘product.’’ As Scharff observes, the automobile was ‘‘born in a masculine
manger and when women sought to claim its power, they invaded a male domain.’’21
Indeed, in underscoring this point, Scharff points out that when the car first appeared
as a commodity, the word ‘‘traffic’’ was most commonly used as a disparaging word
to refer to notions like ‘‘trafficking in drugs’’ or the ways in which women of low
character were said to ‘‘traffic in charms.’’22 A female driver was the cause of gender
trouble, as no proper woman , a woman who fittingly ‘‘reiterated the expectations of
gender behavior,’’ could drive the car by definition.23 Moreover, Scharff argues that
designers such as Henry Ford always tended to see the automobile*/precisely because
it was loud, dirty, and mechanical*/as articulated strictly along gendered lines as a
masculine machine.24
While the automobile’s representation has certainly altered over time, Scharff ’s
analysis illustrates that ‘‘while the auto transformed the particular places men and
women went and the things they did, people remained, at the general level, embedded
in their gendered identities, just as gender remained a critical category of American
culture.’’25 Similarly, Judy Wajcman, acknowledging technology as a social construct
and ‘‘femininity’’ and ‘‘masculinity’’ as malleable concepts, argues that technology in
general is represented as ‘‘male’’ and, hence, to enter the world of the car, ‘‘to learn its
language, women have first to forsake their femininity.’’26 Finally, while O’Connell,
like Scharff, sees ‘‘women motorists’’ as ‘‘symbolic of shifting gender relations,’’ his
overall story is one in which the car is understood through the normative regulation
of femininity and masculinity.27 Hence, for example, even when changes in the car
were recommended and desired by both men and women (e.g., the ignition switch,
the enclosed roof), such changes were represented as a feminization of the car in that
they made the car less ‘‘manly.’’ Even though women were driving and such changes
became ubiquitous, these changes were also ones which reinforced, rearticulated,
resignified cultural meanings of men and women.28 This ‘‘founding’’ ideology of the
car haunts our present, continuing to factor into how we understand cars, how we
market cars, and how we interact with other forms of transportation.29 In short, this
ideological configuration writes gender onto the meaning of the prosthetics
functions.
On the one hand, then, the automobile is a technology or medium that potentially
encourages at least a situational erasure of gender*/anyone can wear a car, and,
because cars in some senses replace our bodies, they erase gender difference in
particular ways. On the other, cultural historians have illustrated that the car was
born within a culture of bi-gendered norms and has been consistently marketed and
understood through the lens of those norms. As Braidotti notes of other media, the
‘‘alleged triumph of high-technologies is not matched by a leap of the human
imagination to create new images and representations. Quite on the contrary, what I
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notice is the repetition of very old themes.’’30 While gender may indeed have been
altered by the automobile, the circulation of common-sense ideology tends toward
stability (i.e., people interpret events through the lens of their previous under-
standings of the world). The gendered body may move inside the structure of the
automobile, but that body’s gender still matters . Drawing on Fiske and Hartley, we
might say that public arguments tend to ‘‘claw’’ meanings back to the familiar rather
than to the new or transitional.31 Because of a desire for stable definitions, and
because of a market system that rewards the popular or familiar over the strange and
indeterminate, gender norms are difficult*/although clearly not impossible*/to
displace.
Together, then, these two different impulses in the relationship of the automobile
and the body emerge in the discourse surrounding the Renshaw case. On the one
hand, because anybody can assumedly drive a car with equal skill regardless of gender,
those involved in competitive racing must deny gender’s significance in a way that is
not true of most other sports. On the other hand, because automobiles and all body
technologies have traditionally been articulated on hetero-normative, bi-gendered
lines, it is never possible that just any-body is driving a car; rather, it is always a
particular type of body*/and the meanings articulated with that body*/in the
driver’s seat. As a result, the Deborah Renshaw case, a case in which a woman finds
herself in trouble (gender and otherwise) in a ‘‘male’’ sport, is perhaps the ideal
location for understanding some of the contours of our shared gender ideology.
Further, in laying bare the articulations that hold together cars and normative gender
assumptions, such an analysis hopefully also helps dismantle such assumptions.
The Trouble with Deborah Renshaw, a ‘‘First Woman’’ Racer
Homosocial Desire Between Cars
In her classic analysis of homosocial desire, Between Men , Eve Sedgwick argues that
homosocial (rather than homoerotic or homosexual) desire functions in part to mark
the differences between men and women. More strongly, Sedgwick suggests that
historically different shades of male and female homosociality may be taken as
‘‘articulations and mechanisms of the enduring inequality of power between women
and men.’’32 More often than not, Sedgwick observes, male homosocial relations
exclude women from political formations generally held by men: ‘‘We can go even
further . . . to say that in any male-dominated society, there is a special relationship
between male homosocial desire and the structures for maintaining and transmitting
patriarchal power.’’33 Sedgwick is not constructing a facile model that configures
women as overtly disciplined and excluded by men in a heavy-handed manner.
Rather, Sedgwick argues that men and women as a whole act in what could be
considered a ‘‘common sense’’ fashion, assuming and naturalizing gender binarisms
as the basis for much human behavior.
In the context of this case, when Renshaw began outperforming many of the men
on the Nashville circuit, homosocial bonding can be seen as at work in the drivers’
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attempt to have Renshaw disqualified, excluding her from a traditionally masculine
space. If we read Renshaw’s success as a disruption of the male driver’s ‘‘oval jerk,’’
their conspiracy can be read as a protection of a homosocial space.34 Moreover, and
perhaps more importantly, public denunciations of this ‘‘male’’ conspiracy*/
denunciations which were seemingly meant to critique exclusion on the basis of
gender*/inadvertently reinforced the very gender binarisms the male drivers were
protecting.
I wish to suggest that this hetero-normative assumption is rearticulated publicly in
the following ways. First, despite repeated claims that gender is irrelevant in racing
because the technology equalizes competition, Renshaw is repeatedly described in
terms that emphasize her traditional female appearance and ‘‘highly cultured’’
feminine interests that are seemingly at odds with the aesthetic and cultural position
of stock-car racing. Second, the male/female binarism is maintained through public
discussions that describe the disqualification plot as a ‘‘soap opera’’ and as a ‘‘gang
bang’’ and represent Renshaw as a traditional female victim. Third, Renshaw’s driving
ability is described through the cultural frame of the ‘‘bad female driver,’’ with her
success said to emerge solely as the result of public fascination with her gender.
The repeated claims made by Renshaw and others concerning the irrelevance of
gender in racing emerges as the product of both the requirement that a competitive
playing field be level for all and as a result of her featured role in what Ruth Rosen has
called the ‘‘first woman’’ story*/a mediated narrative of the ‘‘first’’ woman to enter
any traditional male domains.35 Focusing on mass mediated stories that arose around
‘‘first women’’ in the 1960s and early 1970s, Rosen observes several common themes:
the reports discuss the ‘‘first woman’s’’ appearance and social status (i.e., married,
children) and consistently deny gender’s role in the lives of these women. More
specifically, ‘‘first women’’ overtly claim that ‘‘being a woman had never harmed
them, nor had it helped them,’’ that men do not express hostility toward them, and
that they feel just like ‘‘one of the guys.’’36 Finally, ‘‘first women’’ repeatedly stress that
success comes from merit and from making the right choices.37 While Renshaw is
clearly not the ‘‘first woman race car driver,’’ such racers remain rare enough on any
given circuit that much of the coverage of Renshaw puts her in a ‘‘sole woman’’
narrative that, despite its appearance 30 years after the stories Rosen reports, repeats
much of their logic.
For example, in press coverage of Renshaw appearing before the ‘‘plot’’ at the
Nashville Speedway, gender is repeatedly invoked in order to deny its significance. In
an article in the Atlanta Journal-Constitution , Renshaw makes the following claim,
inadvertently offering a summary of what Sarah Projansky refers to as ‘‘equality and
choice postfeminism’’:38 ‘‘It’s not gender that helps you win. It’s the choices you
make. . . . A woman is just as capable behind the wheel as any man.’’39 Moreover, an
Associated Press story quotes competing driver David Binkley as observing of
Renshaw: ‘‘When she puts that helmet on and climbs into her race car you can’t tell if
she’s a man or a woman*/she’s just a race driver’’ (emphasis mine).40 In an almost
identical statement made after he hired Renshaw, team owner Goodwin claims that
‘‘When you sit in that seat, you’re not a man or a woman. You’re a driver.’’41 What I
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want to emphasize is that such denials of gender relevance are always built with a
caveat that is impossible to bring to fruition. The claim*/overt or implied*/is that
one is neither male nor female ‘‘when you sit in that seat,’’ but it is impossible to sit in
that seat removed from cultural understandings when doing so. Bodies matter, Butler
might remind us here, as they are interpreted through cultural meanings and
discourses. Hence, one never sits in a driver’s seat as an unmarked body; the body
always signifies, always matters . In this case, Renshaw’s body*/a woman’s body*/is
found in a place (not only a car but a race car) in which it does not ‘‘naturally’’
belong. Moreover, because Renshaw was so successful, because she was ‘‘passing’’ so
convincingly, her gender became even more of an issue. The outcome of the races she
participated in contradicted the cultural understandings of the meaning of that body
in that seat. According to cultural gender logic, she was not supposed to win.
Renshaw, then, finds herself in a problematic situation. On the one hand, in order
to fit fairly within the ideology of technology and ‘‘fair competition,’’ she and others
must continually emphasize that, in racing, gender is unmarked. On the other hand,
cultural articulations of her body in a race car are ones that trouble gender
expectations. As a result, as Butler notes, when gender expectations are troubled, the
disciplinary constraints of culture (which work through representations, through
public discussion, through the ways in which individuals discipline one another in
everyday behavior) operate to encourage the gender-troubling parties to rearticulate
their behavior to fit the expectations of proper gender behavior (or to explain how
the improper behavior*/here, racing*/is only one aberration in an otherwise proper
performance).
Day, the leader of the disqualification plot, may make the crassest male-female
gender distinctions when he muses, ‘‘Maybe we’re all a bunch of redneck racers.
Maybe most drivers won’t say it, but if they look at a woman, they’ll think, ‘What’s
she doing’ here?’ Hey, it’s a man’s sport. That’s just the way it is,’’ but he is certainly
not alone in rearticulating those differences.42 For example, Renshaw’s own reported
voice and those of others describing her consistently work to emphasize her
‘‘feminine’’ and refined qualities. Renshaw’s official website suggests that she ‘‘is not
exactly the picture of your typical stock car driver. She is an educated, 26-year-old
with a Bachelor’s Degree.’’43 Reporter Jack Wilkinson describes her in the Atlanta
Journal-Constitution as different than male drivers, in effect, as feminine: ‘‘She is an
attractive, pony tailed, personable, 25-year-old college graduate, the well-heeled
daughter of a wealthy car dealer.’’44 Charleston’s Post and Courier describes Renshaw
as a ‘‘daddy’s girl’’ with dark brown hair.45 Similarly, a Roanoke Times and World
News reporter first observes Renshaw walking ‘‘into the Darlington Raceway media
center wearing low-rider jeans with a wide black belt and a tight black knit shirt that
exposed her midriff,’’ then notes that ‘‘Renshaw has good looks, a college degree and
acting school experience.’’46 Finally, Renshaw’s appearance on a local (Nashville)
sports talk show also provides an example of her representation as a ‘‘proper’’
woman, different than we expect from women involved in racing. During a
commercial break on the show, host Hope Hines informs Renshaw that the first
three questions will be coming from women. He then pauses and adds that while the
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‘‘first three callers are women, we don’t know if they’re ladies.’’ Turning back and
referring to Renshaw as ‘‘Ms. Deborah,’’ he ultimately articulates Renshaw as a proper
lady, as opposed to what we expect from women involved in racing.47 Indeed, Day
might say, what is she doing here?
Reporting about the disqualification plot and Renshaw’s behavior as a result of the
plot also functions to stress Renshaw’s proper performance of femininity (indeed, her
difference from male drivers). The overall arch of the story as covered in multiple
newspaper accounts would run something like this: Renshaw is the star of a soap
opera in which a group of boys attempted to chase her away from their playground.
While Renshaw at first tears up and runs away, she ultimately decides to stand up to
the bullies. For example, an Atlanta Journal-Constitution article is headlined ‘‘A Stock
Car Soap Opera.’’48 The body of the article, after emphasizing Renshaw’s good looks
and personality, describes the events as ‘‘a juicy little stock car soap opera’’ in which
the male racers ganged up on Renshaw in a fit of jealousy. In line with the
representation of the event as soap opera, several reporters make note of Renshaw’s
emotional response to the disqualification, once again emphasizing and naturalizing
gender difference despite the simultaneous attempts at gender erasure. For example,
Teresa Walker of the Associated Press writes that while Renshaw was aware that some
of the men at the track resented her, ‘‘their collusion to get her car disqualified got the
best of her. . . . Renshaw sat in the stands and cried. ‘I’m a woman and women tend to
have more emotions than men do, and they show it in different ways’.’’49
This narrative furthermore lends itself repeatedly to emphasizing that the ‘‘plot’’
pitted ‘‘boys’’ against ‘‘girls.’’ Renshaw claims in the Commercial Appeal (Memphis),
for example, that she had decided to return to racing because she ‘‘didn’t want to
leave the perception that the boys ran the girl off.’’50 Elsewhere, Renshaw is ‘‘some
hot-shot girl,’’51 a ‘‘girl playing a man’s game’’ (emphasis mine),52 a ‘‘girl role
model.’’53 In each case, we have a clear articulation that the differences between
Renshaw and the male drivers is a vast one, marking Renshaw as different than her
opponents and similar to other women.
Descriptions of the plot itself, and the ways the male drivers and Renshaw are
configured in this plot, hauntingly recreate the dynamics of homosocial/homosexual
triangulation and exclusion. Indeed, the single most common metaphor to describe
the ‘‘conspiracy’’ is that it was a case of a group of boys ‘‘ganging up on a girl.’’ This is
a metaphor that invokes violent exclusion through physical and sexual (i.e., gang
bang) terror. The language of such stories creates a scenario in which men gather
together as one to attempt to eliminate or exclude Renshaw; that is, they create bonds
between men in order to exclude the ‘‘so-called feminine in men’’ and the masculine
in women.54
Throughout the coverage of the disqualification plot, one finds persistent
references to a gang of men who pick on an innocent ‘‘girl.’’ On several occasions
when interviewed about her initial decision to quit racing in Nashville, Renshaw
herself employs the metaphor: ‘‘When 12 or 13 men gang up . . . [t]he good ol’ boys
can have their track back.’’55 Reporter John Romano of the St. Petersburg Times more
bluntly observes, ‘‘If you have not heard the story, a bunch of male drivers ganged up
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on the track’s only female competitor in a shameful display of piston envy.’’56
Similarly, reporter Jack Wilkinson summarizes the story as one of ‘‘A bunch of good
ol’ boy drivers ganging up on . . . this poor innocent little girl’’ (emphasis mine).57
As Sedgwick points out, the discourse of the ‘‘gang bang’’ always implies a strong
homosocial (sometimes homosexual) desire between the male aggressors. Hence, the
understanding of the ‘‘plot’’ as a group of men attempting to exclude Renshaw also
works to reconfigure the ‘‘proper performance’’ of masculinity of the men involved in
the plot, especially the leaders. For example, the crowds at the Nashville race track the
following weeks reportedly not only began to openly support Renshaw more
enthusiastically than they had before, but also began to openly question the
masculinity of the male drivers. Reporter Jack Wilkinson provides the following
illustration of one fan’s reaction at seeing Day the week following the disqualification:
‘‘‘Crybaby!’ cried [racing fan] Joe Ryman . . . over a cascading chorus of boos. ‘You’ve
always been a little sissy crybaby !’’’ (emphasis mine).58 Moreover, racing fan Harold
Bryan reportedly began to shout that all of the conspirators were a ‘‘bunch of wimp
rednecks.’’59 Such terms*/‘‘wimp,’’ ‘‘sissy’’ and ‘‘crybaby’’*/coupled with the
narrative in which the men ganged up on an innocent girl works in a cultural logic
which questions the men’s ability to properly perform as men.
The male/female binary is similarly upheld by the employment of the historically
grounded representation of women as unskilled drivers. In Taking the Wheel , Scharff
observes that although cars as a technology were represented early in their history as
dangerous machines, when they became seemingly essential or necessary for culture,
the blame for deaths by automobiles had to shift from the technology itself to
particular users of the technology. (If the technology itself was at fault, the solution is
to get rid of the technology. If, however, particular users are at fault, the solution is to
keep them from using the technology.) While blame was initially placed on
pedestrians for accidents, blame slowly moved to female drivers. Scharff observes,
‘‘Early critics of women drivers, much like their contemporaries who opposed
women’s entry into higher education and woman suffrage, cited three presumed
sources of women’s inferiority at the wheel: emotional instability, physical weakness,
and intellectual deficiencies.’’60 Such charges are clearly linked to almost all
transportation technology. As Constance Penley and Projansky have illustrated,
‘‘lack of skill’’ charges were made against both Christa McAuliffe and child airplane
pilot Jessica Dubroff in narratives and news reports published after the Challenger
disaster and the Dubroff tragedy, respectively.61
Given the historical roots of this trope and our awareness of its functioning in
contemporary culture, when one claims that Renshaw is a ‘‘bad driver,’’ one is once
again illustrating that Renshaw can never be ‘‘just’’ a driver. Rather, claims about her
relative lack of skills once again discipline her back into the proper iteration of
cultural understandings of ‘‘femininity’’ and therefore once again reiterate the gender
norms themselves. Hence, when Day tells an Associated Press reporter that he
questions ‘‘the ability of women to compete,’’ finding most of them to be bad drivers,
he reiterates this norm.62 More directly, when Day tells reporter Teresa Walker, ‘‘I’m
not upset at Deborah because she’s a woman. I’m upset at her because she’s a bad
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driver,’’63 he simultaneously denies the importance of gender and reinvokes its proper
performative iteration.
In sum, in the discourse surrounding the disqualification plot, we see the ways in
which*/again, despite the insistence that gender is invisible in the racing arena*/
gender consistently raises its head to generally reinforce traditional and ‘‘proper’’
cultural understandings of gender and sexuality. Combining our cultural under-
standings of ‘‘male’’ and ‘‘female’’ behaviors with the articulations of gender/sexuality
which have historically emerged around cars, we find a discursive field that is fraught
with a tendency toward stability. That is, while meanings change, and while the
‘‘proper iterations’’ of gender/sexuality are indeed historical, the intersections of
gender, occupation, and automobiles create a discourse that partially re-stabilizes
when faced with transgression (although never completely). Moreover, given the
economic costs of racing, which require that drivers be both skilled and attractive in
order to gain sponsorship, Renshaw finds both ideological and economic incentives
for proper gender behavior. Renshaw, like all ‘‘first women,’’ is represented as highly
cultured and educated, hard working, and able to conclude that gender is irrelevant,
while she simultaneously is faced with a culture that not only consistently tests her
proper femininity but also provides her with economic incentives for proper
performance. In the end, despite the discourse of gender blindness articulated with
prosthetic technologies, gender largely overdetermines, rearticulating and re-signify-
ing the gender of the body in that car.
Judging and Regulating Renshaw
O’Connell observes that by 1993, over half a million deaths had occurred on British
highways alone as a result of automobile accidents.64 As I noted above, in public
arguments, this high number of deaths must be balanced against the benefits the
technology brings to a society. Again, rather than place the blame on the technology
itself, public discourse could justify the use of the car more effectively if the blame
were put on individual types of drivers, or other factors external to the technology
itself (e.g., poorly designed roads, insufficient laws). Early on, and despite ‘‘factual
evidence’’ to the contrary, female drivers became an effective and convincing
scapegoat in the public imaginary.65 One of the implications of this configuration of
women as dangerous drivers is that new laws and regulations concerning ‘‘automotive
safety’’ often were created and/or enforced only after highly publicized accidents
involving women.66 As I will argue below, in the death of driver Eric Martin, this
familiar pattern emerges, one clearly articulated along the lines of gender. Not only
are Renshaw’s general driving skills called into question as a result of the accident, but
new track rules and regulations that would have been useful previous to the accident
are only called for and enacted afterwards.
To recall, in early October 2002, while Renshaw was practicing at Lowe’s Motor
Speedway in Concord, NC for the Easy Care 150 ARCA RE/MAX race, peer driver
Eric Martin lost control of his car in the fourth turn of the 1.5 mile track, evidently as
the result of a blown tire. Renshaw, a half track behind Martin, came around turn
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four*/reportedly 15 seconds after his blow out*/at 160 mph, broadsiding Martin’s
car and killing him instantly.67 The press coverage that followed the accident, in
addition to persistently retelling the story of the ‘‘plot’’ against Renshaw in Nashville,
implicates Renshaw as the cause.68
For instance, on the day following the accident, reporter Lindsey Young helps us
wonder: ‘‘At question is why Renshaw, who according to eye witnesses hit Martin
several seconds . . . after three other cars had avoided Martin’s car, was not informed
of Martin’s spin or did not see the car.’’69 Given a narrative setting in which we are
reminded repeatedly that female drivers are very rare, we are invited to presume that
the three cars which avoided the accident were all driven by men. Further, Tony
Fabrizio of the Tampa Tribune observes that ‘‘something terrible had to go wrong for
her to have hit Martin at nearly full speed. Witnesses estimate that the collision took
place as much as 15 seconds after Martin’s initial wreck.’’70 If others had avoided
Martin’s car, we are asked to wonder, why did Renshaw, with 15 seconds’ warning,
have the accident?
In the days that followed, two arguments crystallized. First, Renshaw was
unprepared as a driver to race in this league. Second, new regulations were needed
to force racing teams to be more careful in the future. An example of the first
argument appears in the Chattanooga Times when Track President H.A. ‘‘Humpy’’
Wheeler and driver Bobby Labonte are said to have ‘‘expressed surprise that Renshaw
didn’t know what was ahead of her,’’ and both wondered ‘‘if she was qualified to be
racing on Lowe’s 1.5 mile oval.’’71 Chris Jenkins of USA Today investigates on-line
discussion sites and notes that Renshaw’s lack of skill became the primary focus
almost immediately: ‘‘Big-Time drivers were questioning her right to race such
powerful cars. . . . The implication: She was in over her head and now somebody was
dead.’’72 Further, after reporting that Winston Cup drivers had declared Renshaw
‘‘guilty’’ in kangaroo courts up and down the garage area the day after the accident,
Jenkins quotes Wayne Hixon, the owner of Martin’s car, as saying that he did not
‘‘think Renshaw belonged on the track. ‘It is racing, some of it is,’ he says, ‘but some
of it is stupidity.’’’73
In a second line of argument, calls for new regulations meant to protect drivers
against incompetence are raised as a result of the accident. Although Lowe’s speedway
had witnessed eight driver’s deaths since opening, many presumably from a similar
‘‘cause’’ (i.e., the fact that the driver’s spotters*/those who warn drivers about
accidents on the track*/were not required to sit in the grandstand during practice
sessions),74 calls for new regulations did not emerge or were not effective until after
(and seemingly as a result of) the Renshaw/Martin accident.
Paralleling the ways in which Renshaw is blamed for the accident, calls for
regulation emerge almost immediately in news reports. For example, Jerry Gappens,
the spokesman for the Speedway, noted the day after the accident that ‘‘this is
something ARCA officials need to look at.’’75 Similarly, the New York Times reported
that ARCA series president Ron Drager wanted to see a change in rules as a result of
the accident.76 Tying the two lines of argument together, Tony Fabrizio of the Tampa
Tribune argues that the accident should not only force ARCA to change rules about
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spotters, but also investigate rule changes that might keep inexperienced drivers like
Renshaw off the track.77 A mere three days after the accident, ARCA indeed did pass
new regulations that required spotters to be in the grandstand whenever team drivers
were on the track.78 Hopefully, it is obvious that I am not suggesting that these new
regulations were a ‘‘bad idea’’*/clearly, this is an easily implemented precaution.
Rather, what I want to point out is the fact that the regulation became an exigency
only after this particular accident.
A comparison of the Renshaw case to discourse and actions following the death of
Dale Earnhardt at NASCAR’s Daytona 500 indicates some gendered differences. In
February 2001, USA Today ’s Jenkins notes that ‘‘Three drivers died of similar severe
head injuries last year. Justifiably, the cry goes out: What can be done to make racing
safer?’’79 In this case, however, reports make it clear that any pressures for change in
safety regulations are emerging from outside the sport rather than inside and that the
accident was inherent to racing itself rather than the fault of any individual, including
driver Sterlin Marlin, who was involved in the accident. For example, Gwen Knapp of
the San Francisco Chronicle observes that while safety changes will probably be
implemented, it will be at the insistence of fans rather than as the desire of NASCAR
itself: ‘‘The changes will come now. The outsiders will insist.’’80 While changes did
come, most notably in the use of head and neck restraint systems by NASCAR
drivers, these changes took a full year compared to the immediate reaction in the
Renshaw case. At several points during public discussion of the accident, NASCAR
President Mike Helton noted, ‘‘We’re simply not going to react for the sake of
reacting,’’81 and CART medical advisor Steve Olvey noted that ‘‘The key thing at a
time like this is to make sure we don’t get a knee-jerk reaction.’’82
In addition, while Renshaw was posited as at fault in her accident, the Earnhardt
accident ultimately gets positioned as inherent to the sport, after initial attempts were
made to place the blame on individuals. For example, immediately after the accident,
Nick Harvey, team manager of the PPI Motorsports Winston Cup Team says of
racing: ‘‘It’s kind of like boxing. You can try to make it as safe as you want, but a guy
still has to hit another guy.’’83 More pointedly and directly, Dale Earnhardt Jr., son of
the Winston Cup champion, openly rebuked those attempting to place blame on
individuals for the accident: ‘‘Any notion or any idea of placing blame on anyone*/
whether it be Sterlin Marlin or anybody else, for that matter*/is ridiculous and will
not be tolerated.’’84 Hence, compared to the Renshaw accident, Earnhardt’s death is
posed as inherent to racing and the fault of equipment rather than individuals.
Rather than attempt to rush to provide regulations, ‘‘studies’’ are conducted to make
sure that there were no ‘‘knee-jerk’’ reactions to the accident.
If common-sense ideology still largely operates with a configuration in which male
drivers are largely evaluated as individuals while female performance is more closely
tied to the ‘‘natural compulsions of sex,’’ it should be no surprise that the exigency is
to create a regulation that protects individual men from all female drivers.85 Again,
while Renshaw and others may consistently repeat that racing is not about gender,
that it is about the ‘‘choices’’ one makes, gender concerns largely overdetermine the
understanding of Renshaw’s skills, of the ‘‘cause’’ of an accident, and of the need for
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regulations. The cultural logic again pulls in many different directions. While
Renshaw as ‘‘first woman’’ must make it clear that she will work hard to achieve
success on her own and that others have mostly given her a ‘‘fair shake,’’ she is
simultaneously configured as part of ‘‘women’’ as a whole and carries their
inefficiencies onto the track.
Renshaw as ‘‘Media Hoax’’
As noted above, despite the fact that other women have raced in both local and
national circuits before Renshaw, her story was treated in news media very clearly
along the patterns of the ‘‘first women’’ stories outlined by Ruth Rosen. Again, one of
the patterns Rosen observed is that the ‘‘first woman’’ story provides great attention
to the ‘‘woman’’ while telling a story in which her skills and efforts, rather than her
gender, led to her success or failure. While the Renshaw case clearly follows this
pattern early in the year, one of the more interesting aspects of the case later in the
year, after the death of Eric Martin, is the way in which media coverage of the ‘‘first
woman’’ story itself becomes an area of blame in Martin’s death. That is, while the
‘‘first woman’’ story itself works to erase gender, when tragedy arises, ‘‘the media’’ is
blamed*/and blames itself*/for paying too much attention to a woman and thereby
placing her in a position to cause damage to herself and/or to others.
While not using the language of ‘‘first women’’ stories, Projansky argues that in the
case of ‘‘first women pilots’’ of any sort (i.e., first balloonist, first female in space,
etc.), news reporters and media representatives have had similar responses when these
‘‘firsts’’ have resulted in tragedy. For example, Projansky notes, in the cases of
balloonist Pearl White, pilot Amelia Earhart, and ‘‘child pilot’’ Jessica Dubroff, media
coverage ultimately ‘‘admonished ‘the media’ itself for paying attention to a ‘media
hoax,’ a story about a woman who was ‘not really a pilot’ or who was ‘not really a
good pilot.’’86 That is, media outlets, through editorials or through publishing the
views of those close to the tragedy, ultimately chastised ‘‘the media’’ itself for
providing so much attention to a ‘‘first woman’’ that the woman oversteps her
abilities, resulting in injury and death of the pilot and others.87 In effect, such reports
offer an apologia for the fact that their own spectacle encouraged a poorly qualified
woman, even though that early coverage attempted to erase gender from the
equation. Ultimately, the news coverage acts as an admission that gender matters after
all.
In Renshaw’s case, the critique of her popularity as unearned and as potentially
dangerous is made early on by some of her competitors (especially those involved in
the disqualification plot), even though it is initially discounted by reporters who are
aligned with the ‘‘first woman’’ erasure of gender. For example, Day suggested that
Renshaw is a dangerous driver because she is ‘‘so star-struck that she can’t focus on
racing.’’88 Moreover, when Goodwin hired Renshaw to be his Busch Series driver, the
Tampa Tribune notes as an aside that while Goodwin knew little about Renshaw’s
‘‘driving ability, he thought she could be a marketing gem*/a ‘female’ Jeff Gordon.’’89
More recently, a letter to the Tennessean makes the following argument after
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suggesting that Renshaw was getting opportunities above her skill level: ‘‘I’m not a
sexist, but I am for fairness. In racing, you have to earn your right to be there. How
many men racers who are more qualified don’t get opportunities because they are not
women? A lot. I’m sure.’’90 In each case, news outlets report that others think
Renshaw is receiving too much attention based on gender rather than skill, even
though the news reports themselves highlight Renshaw’s skills as a driver rather than
as a woman.
Paralleling Projansky’s claims about coverage of women in flight, media reports
later self-reflexively concede that perhaps their coverage was in fact part of the
problem. For instance, John Romano of the St. Petersburg Times offers the following
concession to Renshaw’s competition: ‘‘In a small way, their complaints had merit.
Renshaw’s growing popularity owed more to her gender than her skills.’’91 After the
Martin accident, reporter Jenna Fryer suggests that ‘‘Renshaw’s racing career was on a
fast track’’ due to the media attention she was receiving, and that this perhaps
encouraged Renshaw to enter upper-division racing circuits before she was
prepared.92 Similarly, the Tampa Tribune observes after the accident that while
Renshaw was ‘‘unknown outside Tennessee until this year, she gained attention in July
when fellow drivers at Nashville’s Fairgrounds Speedway pooled their money to file a
protest. . . . [T]he resulting news coverage caught the eye of Busch Series team owner
Goodwin’’ and hence moved Renshaw quickly up the racing ladder.93 Again, I am not
suggesting that self-reflection by individual reporters and/or media outlets is a bad
idea; rather, I would like to suggest that such arguments ultimately work within a
logic that implies that Renshaw was unqualified precisely because she is a woman.
Moreover, given this configuration and the fact that it is a theme oft-repeated in
narrative accounts of female firsts, the cultural logic becomes one which must muse,
if Renshaw is in ‘‘over her head’’ because of gendered publicity, that perhaps this is
true of all female drivers.
Conclusion
As cultural histories of the automobile have illustrated, the entry of automobiles into
mass culture as a technology*/as a prosthetic or ‘‘extension of man’’*/functioned to
trouble a number of different existing cultural logics (e.g., demarcations of public and
private, the boundaries of geographic space) and opened up new social possibilities
(e.g., improved zones for homosexual encounters, altered notions of gender, changing
patterns of dating). That is, the automobile as a technology (i.e., as a medium) altered
relationships among people*/the automobile as medium carried its own message.94
However, and as the oft-repeated critique of media determinism would have it, this is
not the entirety of the story. While cars may have become the ‘‘real population of our
cities,’’95 they did not enter a vacuum but rather entered a cultural landscape that
already contained distinctions of class, race, gender, sexuality, and occupation*/a
culture with a performative language that encouraged its own reiteration, that
encourages its own resignification even when, for instance, ‘‘women drive cars,
instead of adorning men’s cars.’’96 With Braidotti, we see here that the technological
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imaginary cannot wipe out gender (or class) distinctions as they are ultimately
protected by other means.97
While I am not denying that ongoing changes have occurred in the logics of gender
and sexuality and am not denying that there are ways in which consumers can actively
rethink cultural logics, I am using this case to note ways in which contemporary
ideological ‘‘common sense’’ remains powerful, reiterating and resignifying. The case
of Deborah Renshaw provides a ‘‘first woman’’ narrative that ends in tragedy, a first
woman narrative that simultaneously denies the importance of gender while
ultimately reemphasizing it in its own logic. It is a story in which ‘‘choice’’ and
‘‘skill’’ are at first highlighted over gender, ultimately only to be found subsumed once
again under gender expectations.
In short, the Renshaw case reminds us that gender is never, and perhaps can never
be, invisible. Moreover, when one intersects the logic of gender with its articulation
around automobiles generally and racing specifically, one finds the expectations of
gender more rigidly binding, more difficult to ignore. As I have illustrated, in the
discourse surrounding both of the stories about Renshaw’s 2002 season, gender is
resignified in multiple ways*/in Renshaw’s own reported words, in other people’s
discussion about Renshaw and in the logic of the news reports themselves. For
example, Renshaw is reported as suggesting that women naturally react emotionally
in ways different than men; Renshaw’s appearance and clothing are emphasized in
particularly gendered ways and in ways absent from descriptions of most male
drivers; her male peer group ‘‘gangs up’’ to discipline her for, in effect, receiving too
much of the attention that they deserve. Moreover, after the death of fellow racer Eric
Martin, Renshaw receives blame in a context that questions her abilities as a driver,
and*/given Renshaw’s connection to future female drivers via the ‘‘first woman’’
narrative and male-female differences that are reiterated in reports about her*/in a
context that questions the ability of all female drivers and all potential female racers.
In The Car in British Society, O’Connell goes to some pains on several occasions to
make his reader aware that the ‘‘ideological’’ intersections of gender and automobiles
generally operate ‘‘automatically,’’ as common sense, that bi-gendered logic was
assumed historically by most men and women in their relationships with
automobiles.98 As O’Connell puts it, the history of the automobile is ‘‘not a story
of brutish men denying women their freedom. . . . What has been explained is the role
played by gender ideology in the normative regulation of femininity and masculinity
within the context of motoring.’’99 Whether behaving to gender expectations
automatically or thinking about the consequences of not doing so, we largely
reinforce the logic of those expectations, perhaps especially so when those
expectations are troubled.
Hence, when Renshaw finds herself riding in cars ‘‘between men,’’ men who bond
socially and professionally through her exclusion and the preservation of male space,
Renshaw initially decides to ‘‘let the old boys’’ have their game back. On those
grounds, gender performative expectations are protected. However, those expecta-
tions are perhaps more importantly*/or rather, more insidiously*/protected by the
common sense with which people operate when Renshaw decides to continue racing.
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When NASCAR’s ‘‘diversity council,’’ for example, posits Renshaw as the prototype of
women drivers who could attract a larger female audience (she is attractive and well
spoken), they are implicitly acknowledging that she is the ‘‘proper’’ type of female
driver.100 Or, when a reporter notes, after Renshaw was hired by Goodwin, that
‘‘[r]acing insiders don’t know much about her driving ability, but they say she could
be a marketing gem’’ because she has ‘‘good looks, a college degree and acting school
experience,’’ that reporter is acknowledging*/and simultaneously reiterating*/the
power of capital on proper gender performance.101 Or, when Goodwin is quoted in
the same news report as saying that ‘‘[w]hen you sit in that seat, you’re not a man or a
woman’’ and observes that he was interested in hiring Renshaw because ‘‘as an
attractive woman, she’s attractive to sponsors,’’ we understand that one is never just a
driver, never just sitting in that seat.102 When a television host consistently refers to
Renshaw as ‘‘the lovely Deborah Renshaw’’ and contrasts ‘‘the lovely Deborah
Renshaw’’ with ‘‘unladylike’’ callers, we know that he understands the proper
performance of gender and assumes that his audience shares that understanding.103
Ultimately, then, this essay should be read as an attempt to underline the discursive
weight of gender ideology and its intersection with the cultural logic of automobiles
and of automobile racing. Moreover, this is an attempt not only to trace out some
contemporary links between gender and the automobile, between gender and a
particular occupation, but to make an argument about those links that will help us all
remember to problematize them. Revolutions are slow, as Raymond Williams
continues to whisper, because meanings often change at a snail’s pace. In bringing
‘‘common sense’’ into relief, I mean to encourage each of us to trouble this case in
particular and to continue to remain vigilant in problematizing the constraints of
gender ideology in all other domains.104
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